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But it is pretty to see what money will do. 
Samuel Pepys (1667) 
Retirement requires income, whether in the form of  state-provided retirement 
or disability benefits, private pensions, income from other family members, or 
assets. Researchers have investigated the role that each of these income sources 
plays in the retirement decision, largely using cross-sectional data for the years 
after the 1960s. But the applicability of  cross-sectional estimates to periods 
outside the sample range is questionable. Seventy percent of the decline in the 
labor force participation rates of men age sixty-five or older occurred before 
1960. Retirement rates were already high by  1960, and thus only large benefit 
increases could have enticed those remaining in the labor force to have with- 
drawn. To understand why retirement rates increased prior to 1960, we must 
examine earlier data. 
An analysis of retirement requires information on retirement status, demo- 
graphic characteristics (e.g., age), health, a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
not working (e.g., forgone income or occupation), and retirement income (e.g., 
pension  amount). These are very  strict data requirements. One of  the few 
sources of information on the elderly of the past, the census, allows us to relate 
retirement status only to demographic characteristics, not to wealth. Fortu- 
nately, a data set that meets our requirements can be created from records gen- 
erated by the Union army pension program. 
This chapter will focus on the determinants of work levels in both 1900 and 
1910 among white Union army veterans receiving Union army pensions. These 
men were the first cohort to reach age sixty-five in the twentieth century. They 
also represent a very broad cross section of the population. Eighty-one percent 
of all white, northern men born in 1843 served in the Union army during the 
Civil War. These men became eligible for an extremely generous pension, and 
the copious records generated by the Pension Bureau bureaucracy allow us to 
reconstruct their life histories. Additional information can be gathered by  link- 
ing pension records to other sources, such as census manuscripts, The resulting 
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data set provides a unique picture of the life of the elderly at the turn of the 
century. 
The data set created from Union army records provides information on re- 
tirement income in the form of Union army pensions. The receipt or level of 
Union army pensions, which replaced about 30 percent of  the income of  an 
unskilled laborer, did not depend on current income or past wages.  Rather, 
their generosity was determined by the pensioner’s health. Because the amount 
received also depended on whether the veteran could trace his disability to the 
war and not just on the seriousness of his infirmity, the effect of pensions on 
labor supply can be disentangled from that of health. Therefore, Union army 
pensions can be used to estimate a pure income effect on labor supply, thus 
revealing the effect of income growth on retirement and bearing  on income 
effects arising from the Social Security program. 
3.1  The Economics of Retirement 
Many factors are likely to affect the retirement decision. As health deterio- 
rates with age, work may become more arduous, and therefore men’s desire to 
leave paid labor may increase. After initially rising with age, earnings generally 
decline with age, thus increasing the incentive to retire. Earnings today peak 
at age fifty to fifty-nine, whereas in the past earnings peaked at ages thirty to 
thirty-nine and declined by almost 30 percent by age sixty (Haber and Gratton 
1994, 76). In addition, retirement income tends to be lower than income while 
working. By continuing to work, not only do men enjoy a higher income than 
they would if they retired, but they are also able to accumulate more savings 
or increase their entitlements to Social Security and private pension benefits. 
They can thus support higher retirement consumption at a later date-a  date 
when there will be fewer remaining years of  life over which support would 
have to be provided. A richer society is able to support more years of retirement 
because, when wages are low, men find it hard to accumulate enough savings 
to finance their retirement. 
Not all retirement  income is earned during the working years. Some men 
inherit wealth from their parents, and today most receive retirement benefits 
from the state. Until recently, retiring cohorts have received aggregate Social 
Security benefits that far exceed the present value of the contributions made 
by them and their employers (Boskin and Shoven 1987). The Civil War cohort 
was even more fortunate. Union army pensions were given regardless of labor 
force participation status and therefore both directly increased the income of 
retired veterans  and allowed them  to accumulate  more wealth  during their 
working years, thus enabling them to retire earlier. 
Union army pensions represent a pure income effect on labor supply and 
therefore should have induced more men to retire at any given age. The ques- 
tion I pose is by  how much Union army pensions reduced  labor supply for 
veterans in their later years. This question can be answered with the help of a 34  Chapter3 
simple model of the retirement decision. Although the model is so oversimpli- 
fied that it cannot literally be true, when interpreted with care, it enables us to 
judge the effect of pensions on retirement rates. 
At any date, a veteran can be thought of as making a choice between retire- 
ment and labor force participation. The well-being in each option will be deter- 
mined by  the income flows associated with each option, how  enjoyable the 
veteran finds leisure and how  unpleasant work, and the stigma costs of  not 
working, among other factors. Well-being or utility when not working can be 
written as 
U,(Y  + B  + N, H;  Z) 
and utility when not working as 
q(B  + N, 0;  Z), 
where Y is labor market income, B is pension income, N is other non-labor 
market income, 2 is a vector of  demographic and socioeconomic variables 
likely to affect utility (such as age and number of children), and  is hours of 
market work. Then, assuming that the utility functions are linear in their argu- 
ments and that differences in tastes across individuals produce utility functions 
containing normally distributed random taste shifters, the individual can be 
thought of as evaluating the decision function 
I*  =  U,(B + I?,  0; 2)  - U,(Y + B  + N, H;  Z). 
Although the value of  I*  is not observed, a discrete retirement indicator is 
observed, given by 
I={  0  ifl*<O, 
1  otherwise, 
where 1 represents retirement and 0 labor force participation. We do not know 
whether well-being when  retired  greatly or only narrowly outweighs well- 
being when not retired, nor are we even assuming that an individual can look 
forward to a comfortable retirement. However, if an individual is retired, then 
utility when retired must be greater than utility when not. 
The decision function that the veteran evaluates can be rewritten as 
I*  =  U)(B + N, 0;  Z)  - U,(Y + B  + N, H; 2) 
=  -X'P+E, 
where X  is a vector containing  B, N,  %,  and 2,  p is a parameter vector, and 
E is a standard normal error term. Recall that pensions might have two different 
effects on the retirement decision. Pensions will directly affect income flows, 
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receipt of pensions in the past may affect the value of N, allowing veterans to 
retire earlier. Only the direct effect of pensions will be estimated. The esti- 
mated effect of pensions will therefore be a lower-bound estimate. Using the 
indicator function, I, the effect of  characteristics such as pension amount in- 
cluded in X  on the probability of  retirement will be estimated by  means of 
a probit, 
prob(Z  = 1)  = prob(e  < X’p) = @(X’p), 
where @(  ) is a standard normal cumulative distribution function. Knowing 
how the receipt and level of Union army pensions were determined, we can 
use this model to identify the effect of  Union army pensions on retirement 
rates. The next section therefore provides a brief description of the Union army 
pension program and records. A more detailed description is given in appendix 
A at the end of the book. 
3.2  Civil War Pensions and Union Army Records 
By  1900 the scope of  the pension program, run for the benefit of  Union 
veterans and their dependent children and widows, was enormous. Benefits 
consumed almost 30 percent of the federal budget (Vinovskis 1990), and veter- 
ans lobbied vociferously for high tariffs to continue feeding the federal surplus 
(Glasson 1918a, 218-19).  Even though Confederates were ineligible and im- 
migration increased the population, a large percentage of the population was 
collecting benefits. Among all white males, 35 percent of those aged fifty-five 
to fifty-nine were on the pension rolls, 21 percent of those aged sixty-five to 
sixty-nine, 14 percent of those aged sixty-five to sixty-nine, and 9 percent of 
those aged seventy or older. The annual value of the average veteran pension 
was $135, or 53 percent of  the annual income of  farm laborers, 36 percent 
of that of nonfarm laborers, 20 percent of that of carpenters, blacksmiths, or 
salesmen, and 12 percent of that of landlords or merchants.’ 
The generosity of the Union army pension program arose from a number of 
causes. Like the elderly today, elderly Union veterans wielded considerable 
political might. Union pensions were a prominent election issue throughout 
the latter half  of  the nineteenth century and the beginning of  the twentieth. 
While Union veterans constituted a relatively small group, they were, however, 
extremely well organized, again like the elderly today. The veterans’ organiza- 
tion sent lobbyists to Congress and communicated with its members through 
local chapters and through newspapers. This organization was able to form an 
effective political alliance with manufacturing interests to maintain high tariffs 
and to redistribute the resulting revenue to its members. Because veterans had 
defended the Union, and because the federal treasury was relatively flush, vet- 
erans’ pensions had the backing of many Americans. 
Congress established the basic system of pension laws, known as the Gen- 
eral Law pension system, in 1862 to provide pensions to both regular recruits 36  Chapter3 
and volunteers who were disabled  as a direct result of military service. The 
dollar amount received depended on the degree of disability, where disability 
was determined by  the applicant’s capacity to perform  manual labor. Under 
later reinterpretations  the total  disability  standard  soon meant  incapacity to 
perform even lighter types of manual labor. In fact, men judged disabled con- 
tinued to labor in physically demanding, manual occupations. Inability to per- 
form manual labor remained the standard in this and all subsequent laws, re- 
gardless of the wealth of the individual or his ability to earn a living by other 
than manual means. Withdrawal from the labor force was not a necessary pre- 
requisite for the receipt of a pension.  If  the claimant  had lesser disabilities, 
then he received an amount proportionate to  his disabilities. Application was 
made through a pension attorney, and the degree of disability was determined 
by a board of three local doctors employed by the Pension Bureau and follow- 
ing guidelines established by the bureau. 
An act of 27 June 1890 instituted a universal disability and old-age pension 
program for Union  veterans. According  to the veterans’  lobby, the new  law 
would “place upon the rolls all survivors of the war whose conditions of health 
are not practically perfect” (quoted in Glasson  1918a, 233). In fact, within a 
year of  the act’s passage,  the number of  pensioners  on the rolls more than 
doubled. Any disability now entitled a veteran to a pension. However, an appli- 
cant who could trace his disability to wartime service received  substantially 
more for the same disability than his counterpart who could not. By 1900 men 
who  could  not  claim  a  disability  of  service  origin  received  from $6.00 to 
$12.00 per month or from 19 to 38 percent of the monthly income of a laborer, 
while men who could claim a war-related disability generally received a pen- 
sion  ranging  from $6.00  to $35.00  per month  or up to  109 percent  of  the 
monthly income of a laborer. Although few men were eligible, pensions  for 
war-related disabilities could be as much as $100 per month, close to one-third 
the yearly  income of  a laborer.  By  1900, 58 percent  of  veterans who were 
Union army pensioners were collecting a pension for disabilities unrelated to 
wartime service (U.S. Bureau of Pensions 1900). 
Table 3.1 illustrates differences in pension amounts according to whether a 
veteran could trace his disability to the war and thus fell under the 1862 law 
rather than the 1890 law. Controlling for health, men who fell under the 1862 
rather than the  1892 law received much larger pensions. Fifty-six percent of 
the very disabled were receiving pensions of over $12.00 and 44 percent pen- 
sions of  $12.00  or less. That individuals of the same health status received 
different pension amounts will prove to be very important to my subsequent 
estimation strategy. The difference in pension amount will allow me to identify 
the effect of pensions and of health on the retirement decision. 
The Pension Bureau instructed the examining surgeons in  1890 to grant a 
minimum pension to all men at least sixty-five years of age, unless they were 
unusually vigorous. At age seventy-five men became eligible for an even larger 
pension. In 1904, Executive Order 78 officially authorized the Pension Bureau 37  Income and Retirement 
Table 3.1  Monthly Pension Means and Pension Rates by Percentile, by Health 
Status and Law, 1900 ($) 
Percentile 

























































































Source: Calculated from the data used in the estimation. The health variable used is based on the 
ratings of the examining surgeons. 
to grant pensions on the basis of age. The Service and Age Pension Act of 6 
February 1907 marks official congressional recognition of  age as sufficient 
cause to qualify for a pension. Veterans aged sixty-two to  sixty-nine now 
received $12.00 per month, those aged seventy to seventy-four $15.00  per 
month, and those older than seventy-four $20.00 per month. Because most 
eligible veterans were already on the rolls, this act mainly induced pensioners 
to switch from the 1890 law to the 1907 law; it did not increase the total num- 
ber of pensioners. Whereas in 1900 slightly more than half of all veterans were 
collecting a pension under the 1890 law, by  1910 64  percent of  all veterans 
were collecting under the 1907 law, 22 percent under the General Law, and 
only 14 percent under the 1890 law (U.S.  Bureau of Pensions 1910). Pension 
amount now depended primarily on age and whether a veteran could trace his 
disabilities to the war (see table 3.2). 
The samples of veterans that I use are random samples of the veteran popula- 
tion and contain disproportionate numbers of rural, native-born men.2 None- 
theless, as discussed in greater detail in appendix A, we can draw inferences 
from these samples for the entire population. The men in these samples do 
not differ in observable characteristics (e.g., home ownership, marital status, 
literacy, and age) from the male population in northern states. Controlling for 
rural residence, they resemble the northern population of men  in occupation 
and foreign birth. The samples are also representative of the northern popula- 
tion in terms of mortality and wealth. 38  Chapter3 
Table 3.2  Monthly Pension Means and Pension Rates by Percentile, by Age, 
Health Status, and Law, 1910 ($) 
Percentile 
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Source: Calculated from the data later used  in estimation. The health variable used was based on 
the ratings of the examining surgeons. 
The reconstruction of  the life histories of  men who fought for the Union 
army in the American Civil War  represents a unique data source on a past 
population. Because such a large percentage of the male population fought in 
the Civil War, we can generalize from this sample to the population as a whole. 
Because the peculiar rules of  the Union army pension program led to men 
who were equally disabled receiving very different pension amounts, we can 
identify the effect of pensions on the retirement behavior of veterans. Because 
neither demographic nor occupational characteristics nor the lawyer through 
whom the pensioner applied predicts either the ratings of  the examining sur- 
geons or pension amount, we can be sure that our results are not tainted by 
past fraud. Furthermore, whether a man could trace his disability to the war 
can be used to identify the relation between retirement and pension amount 
free from the confounding effects of  potential endogeneity between pension 
amount and retirement status. This is because the ability to claim war-related 
disabilities or  receive a pension under the General Law,  and therefore to re- 
ceive a larger pension, is arguably unrelated to unobservable determinants of 
retirements. Whether a veteran received a pension under the General Law de- 
pended on the often incorrect medical theories of the time. 
3.3  Pensions and Retirement 
Compared with the general population, Union army veterans retired at a 
greater rate at all ages. This is evident in figure 3.1, which compares retirement 39  Income and Retirement 
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Fig. 3.1  Comparison of retirement rates among veterans and a random sample 
of white men, 1900 and 1910 
Note:  To  ensure comparability with the veteran sample, the random samples were reweighted to 
have the same age distribution as the veteran sample and were restricted to men who were either 
born in  a Union state or who, if  foreign-born, immigrated prior to the Civil War. The random 
samples contain both veterans and nonveterans. Because one of the questions asked in the 1910 
census was veteran status, by  type of veteran, retirement rates for both veterans and nonveterans 
in the random sample are given in 1900. The random samples were drawn from Ruggles and Sobek 
(1995). All samples were limited to the noninstitutionalized. 
rates by  age group among men in the Union army sample with the general 
population in both 1900 and 1910. Thus, among men aged sixty to sixty-nine 
in 1900, retirement rates among veterans were 15 percent, whereas they were 
only 9 percent in the general population. Among men of the same age in 1910, 
they were 28 percent among veterans but only 22 percent in the general popu- 
lation. In 1910, when veteran status of the general population is known, retire- 
ment rates of veterans in the general population can be compared to those of 
nonveterans. With the exception of  ages eighty to ninety-one, an age group of 
which veterans composed a relatively small fraction in 1910, the retirement 
rates of veterans are sharply higher than those of nonveterans. This difference 
between veteran and  nonveteran retirement rates is underestimated because 
undernumeration of  veterans in the  1910 census implies that the retirement 
rates of nonveterans are overestimated. 
Figure 3.1 suggests that retirement rates were higher for veterans because 40  Chapter3 
of Union army pensions, but other reasons could explain this finding. Morbid- 
ity rates may have been higher for veterans, and poor health, not the pension, 
may have been the driving factor. After all, 31 percent of veterans claimed to 
have had an injury or gunshot wound while in service. Even those who had 
not been injured may still have suffered long-term effects from the infectious 
diseases endemic in the army. Over three-quarters of  men paid a visit to the 
camp hospital or saw a camp surgeon during their service. The effect of pen- 
sions thcrefore  needs to be distinguished  from that of health by comparing 
retirement  rates  of  veterans with  similar health  status but  different pension 
levels within the Union army sample. 
I use the ratings of the examining  surgeons to construct  health variables. 
The surgeons rated each specific disability, and I use the surgeons’ ratings to 
classify each veteran as being in good, fair, or poor health. Other health proxies 
could have been used, but the results remain unchanged regardless of whether 
the surgeons’ ratings, the Body Mass Index (see sec. 4.  I.  1 ),  or the presence of 
a chronic disease is used. 
Figure 3.2 shows that men younger than seventy were more likely to be 
retired either if they were receiving higher pensions or if they were in poorer 
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Fig. 3.2  Retirement rates among veterans under seventy years of age by 
pension amount, 1WU and 1910 41  Income and Retirement 
health. In 1900, 8 percent of veterans receiving a monthly pension of $12.00 
or less were retired, as opposed to 24 percent of those receiving a pension of 
more than $12.00. In 1910,43  percent of veterans receiving a monthly pension 
of $15.00 or more were retired, as opposed to only 25 percent of those receiv- 
ing a pension of  less than $15.00. Retirement rates were about 40 percent 
higher among those in poor health than among those in good or fair health. 
Figure 3.2 does not provide conclusive proof that veterans were responding 
to increased income. The receipt of a large pension and  disability were corre- 
lated because of the rules of the pension program. Therefore, figures 3.3 and 
3.4 show retirement rates by  health category and by  pension amount among 
Percentage  Retired 
/  14  8.2 
GOOd/Fair  Poor 
Health 
Fig. 3.3  Retirement rates by disability status among veterans under seventy 
years of age, 1900 
Percent Retired 
Less  Than $15.0 
21.7  35.9 
GoodPair  Poor 
Health 
Fig. 3.4  Retirement rates by disability status among veterans under seventy 
years of age, 1910 42  Chapter3 
men younger than seventy years of age. Retirement rates were higher at higher 
pension amounts among those in good or fair health and for those in poor 
health, and the difference in retirement rates by  health status is statistically 
significant in  1910. But, because men with war-related disabilities, and thus 
those eligible for a large pension, were not a random sample, this evidence is 
still insufficient proof of a relation between income and retirement. 
Men  with  war-related disabilities had  different service, occupation, and 
health histories. Compared with men whose disabilities were not service re- 
lated, men who claimed a disability of service-related origin were more likely 
to have been discharged for a disability, to have been prisoners of war, and to 
have been volunteers. They were also more likely to have been farmers and 
less likely to have been professionals and proprietors. Interestingly, there is no 
significant difference in the percentage claiming injury or gunshot wounds, but 
men without service-related disabilities were more likely to claim rheumatism, 
gastrointestinal disorders other than diarrhea, respiratory disorders, hernias, 
and conditions that could not be classified. Men who could trace their disabili- 
ties to the war entered the rolls earlier, were judged by the surgeons to be in 
worse health, and were less likely to live out their expected life span. Even 
though men who could trace their disabilities to the war had different charac- 
teristics than those who could not, an income effect from pensions can still be 
identified provided that I can control for these characteristics. 
Recall that the empirical specification that will be estimated is a probit, 
prob(Z  = 1)  = prob(& < X’p)  = @(X’p), 
where I is equal to one if the individual is retired and 0 otherwise; X is a vector 
containing both labor and nonlabor income, pension income, and demographic 
and socioeconomic variables; p is a parameter vector; and a(  ) is a standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. Although direct evidence on earnings 
and wealth is not available, several proxies are. I use past occupation as a proxy 
for the opportunity cost of  not working, where occupation  is  classified as 
farmer, professional or proprietor, artisan, and semiskilled or unskilled laborer, 
including farm laborer. For men in 1910 this is either occupation in 1900 or, 
for those retired in 1900, occupation at an earlier date as given in the pension 
records. For men in 1900 this is either occupation in 1900, if working, or past 
occupation as given in the pension records. Men whose occupation could not 
be discerned from the pension records were assigned to an occupation class on 
the basis of their occupation at enlistment and their probability of  switching 
occupation category given their individual characteristics. These men could 
just as well have been assigned to random occupations; the results on pension 
amount remain unchanged. Past occupation may be a poor proxy for opportu- 
nity cost if the ill are no longer able to work in their usual occupation, and for 
these men the opportunity cost of retirement is underestimated. Therefore, the 
effect of pensions may be overestimated. 43  Income and Retirement 
Other indicators of lower earnings are illiteracy and foreign birth. Marital 
status may also be measuring earnings if employers favored married men or if 
married men were more skilled. In  1900, married males  in manufacturing 
earned 17 percent more than unmarried males, controlling for the observable 
characteristics of  workers and their jobs (Goldin 1990, 102). Among home 
owners in cities, letting rooms to boarders increased family income but may 
be symptomatic of economic difficulties (Modell and Hareven 1973). The hire 
of a servant is an indicator of affluence, but servants may have played an impor- 
tant role in family market enterprises, particularly among farmers or small 
business owners. Home ownership meant that the person had wealth because 
a substantial down payment, generally equal to half the value of the purchased 
property, was required (Haines and Goodman 1992).3  Because long-term un- 
employment was often a prelude to retirement, higher unemployment in the 
veteran’s current state, available in  1900 but not in  1910, may have induced 
more retirement.4  Additional control variables are region of residence, extent 
of urbanization, and whether the veteran was discharged for disability from the 
army, a measure of early health status. 
The probit results for 1900 are presented in table 3.3. It should not come as 
a surprise that the older were more likely to retire. Note that a single linear 
term in age is included because tests revealed that in 1900 the probability of 
retirement did not increase sharply at a specific age.5 Those living in states 
with high unemployment rates and those in poor health were significantly more 
likely to retire. Those who owned no property were also significantly more 
likely to retire, but, because property ownership is known only for household 
heads, this variable is also an indicator of  living arrangements. Having ser- 
vants, boarders, and four or more dependents in the household reduced the 
probability of retirement, but not significantly so, as did being married, foreign 
born, or illiterate. Nonfarmers were less likely to retire than farmers, and, in 
the case of professionals and proprietors, the difference in retirement rates was 
statistically significant. I discuss the effect of occupation on retirement, partic- 
ularly of farm occupation, in more detail in chapter 5. Interestingly, those who 
had  been discharged from the service for disability were significantly less 
likely to be retired in  1900 even though they were in worse health than men 
who had not been discharged for disability. These men changed to a less physi- 
cally demanding occupation after enlistment, which may have enabled them to 
remain in the labor force longer. 
The effect on the probability of retirement of  a unit change in one of  the 
independent variables is given by the partial derivative of the probability func- 
tion P with respect to that independent variable. Thus, a $10.00 increase in 
monthly pension income raises the retirement probability by  0.09.6 Coeffi- 
cients on interactions of  pension amount with poor health and dummies for 
older ages and  an  above-average unemployment rate  are  small  and insig- 
nificant. 
As previously noted, those with higher pensions may have been less healthy, 44  Chapter3 
Table 3.3  Probit of Determinants of Probability of Retirement, with Retirement 
Status as the Dependent Variable, 1900 (526 observations, pseudo 
R’  = .22 
Variable  Mean  Est.  S.E.  apiax 
Dummy = 1 if retired 
Intercept 
Monthly pension 
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-  ,0935 
-.0168 
-  ,0046 
-.1891 
-.0515 
-  ,0895 
-  ,0486 
-  ,0249 
-.0031 
,0828 
-  ,0540 
,0799 
,3644 
Note: The omitted dummies are good health, farmer, and eastern residence. The symbols *, 7, and 
$ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 per- 
cent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. aPlax = p(  lln) 1  + (x’p), where + is the standard normal 
density, and dP1ax is in probability units. 
but their poorer health may be unobservable. Furthermore, although pensions 
were  awarded regardless  of  participation  status, nonparticipation  may  have 
been viewed by employees of the Pension Bureau as evidence of an inability 
to perform manual labor. It is therefore unclear whether we are measuring the 
effect of pensions on retirement rates or the effect of retirement on pensions. 
Pension status is potentially endogenous, and all coefficients  may be biased. 
Fortunately, unbiased estimates of the coefficients can be obtained through the 
use of a proxy that is highly correlated with pension amount but uncorrelated 
with  the  error term  appearing  in  the  regression  equation.  Such a  proxy  is 
known as an instrumental variable. 
The instrumental variable that I use is whether the veteran received a pen- 
sion under the General Law, that is, whether he could trace his disability to his 45  Income and Retirement 
wartime service. Recall that the ability to establish that a disability was related 
to wartime service depended on the recruit's record of  military service and 
prevailing medical theory. The ability to establish whether a disability could 
be traced to wartime service predicts pension amount and is arguably not re- 
lated to unobserved retirement determinants conditional on measured health 
status. Although the war disabled entered the pension rolls eight years earlier 
than those not war disabled, the war disabled were not necessarily disabled 
earlier in life and therefore did not necessarily receive less job training and 
therefore have lower opportunity costs of not working. Whether a recruit could 
trace his disability to the war does not predict whether his occupation in 1900 
was of lower socioeconomic status than his occupation at enlistment. Further- 
more, the fraction of men who were property owners does not vary by ability 
to establish whether a disability was war related. A dummy variable indicating 
whether a recruit could trace his disability to the war, that is, whether he fell 
under the General Law, is therefore used as an instrumental variable. 
Assuming that whether a recruit could trace his disability to the war is a 
legitimate instrument, consistent estimates of  pension amount on retirement 
can be obtained easily. In the first stage, pension amount is regressed on the 
exogenous variables, that is, all variables except for pension amount, and a 
dummy equal to one if the recruit could trace his disability to the war. In the 
second stage, a probit is estimated in which a retirement dummy is regressed 
on pension amount, the exogenous variables, and the residuals from the first 
stage. This method, known as two-stage conditional maximum likelihood, was 
developed by Rivers and Vuong (1988).' A convenient feature of this estima- 
tion procedure is that it becomes possible to test statistically whether pension 
amount is determined by  retirement status.* If  pension amount is not deter- 
mined by retirement status, then the coefficient on the residuals will be equal 
to zero when uncorrected standard errors are used. In fact, the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the residuals is not equal to zero can be rejected only at the 
85 percent level of significance, suggesting that endogeneity is not a problem. 
Table 3.4 compares probit estimates with those from a two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood procedure among men for whom information on whether 
the disability can be traced to the war is a~ailable.~  The first-stage estimates 
are also presented. The two columns that should be compared are those giving 
the derivatives and marked 8Pl8x. These columns show that the change in the 
coefficient on pension amount is small, with the estimated mean effect of  a 
dollar increase in monthly pension amount on retirement probability rising 
from 0.0092 when a probit is estimated to 0.0101 when two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation is used. As in the simple probit, coefficients 
on interactions of  pension amount with other variables are small and insig- 
nificant. 
Endogeneity is not the only source of potential bias. Another possible source 
of bias is that from sample selection. If  pensions affected survivorship, then 
the men surviving to 1900 will be a selected sample, and the coefficient on Table 3.4  Comparison of Probit and Two-Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
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.03  .0101 
.o  I  ,0115 
.I8  .0664 
.21  -.I358 
.24  ,0658 
.29  ,0692 
.27  .0892 
.25  -.0787 
.24  -.0246 
.22  ,0246 
.70  -.2269 
.41  -.0621 
.29  -.0890 
.22  -.0189 
.26  -.0376 
.32  -.0296 
.25  .0961 
.48  -.0467 
.I8  ,0905 
.65  ,3615 
.03  -.0010 
Source: Costa (1995b). 
Note: The first stage is a regression of pension amount on the exogenous variables and whether the disabil- 
ity was traceable to the war, that is, whether the veteran fell under the General Law. The second stage is 
a probit with the exogenous variables, pension amount, and the first-stage residuals as explanatory vari- 
ables. The standard errors have been corrected. The symbols *, t,  and $ indicate that the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
aPlax = p(l/n) 14  (x'p), where + is the standard normal density, and aPldx is in probability units. 47  Income and Retirement 
pensions will be biased.'O  I tested whether pension amount affects life expec- 
tancy using a proportional hazards model where the dependent variable was 
the number of years lived after 1900. Controlling for health, pension amount 
did not affect the probability of mortality. Neither did date of entry, suggesting 
that duration of the receipt of a pension was not an important predictor of mor- 
tality. 
Now that we can be confident that our results are not tainted by bias, we can 
estimate how responsive retirement rates are to changes in pension income. 
One way of measuring responsiveness is to calculate elasticities of labor force 
nonparticipation with respect to pension income from mean derivatives and 
retirement probabilities. In the probit specification in table 3.3 above, and at 
the pension mean of $12.90, the elasticity is 0.73 (= 0.0090 [12.9/0.1589]), 
indicating that a 1 percent increase in pension amount increases retirement by 
0.73 percent. Evaluated half a standard deviation below and above the pension 
mean, the elasticities are 0.53 (= 0.0076 [9.0/0.1289]) and 0.88 (= 0.0104 
[  16.8/0.1990]), respectively. Hence, the larger the pension income, the larger 
the elasticity. Using the two-stage conditional maximum likelihood method 
used  in  table  3.4,  and  evaluating at  the  pension  mean,  the  elasticity  of 
labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income rises slightly to 
0.80 (= .0101 [12.9/0.1625]). 
The results obtained for  1900 should be compared with  those for  1910, 
when veterans were ten years older. Probit results for 1910 are given in table 
3.5. As in 1900, the older, those in poor health, and those who owned no prop- 
erty are significantly more likely to be retired. Having either a servant or two 
or more dependents in the household becomes a significant predictor of retire- 
ment. In contrast to the 1900 results, being foreign born raised the probability 
of retirement in 1910, a finding consistent with the pattern seen in the general 
population. Although the coefficient on whether a veteran was discharged for 
disability was no longer significant, those so discharged were still less likely 
to be retired. Professionals, proprietors, and artisans were less likely to be re- 
tired than farmers, and the difference between farmer and artisan retirement 
rates was statistically significant. Compared with farmers, laborers were more 
likely to be retired, but the difference in retirement rates is not statistically sig- 
nificant. 
A $10.00 increase in monthly pension income raises the retirement probabil- 
ity by  0.112. Once again, coefficients on interactions of pension amount with 
poor health and age dummies are small and insignificant, but the coefficients 
on the interactions of pension amount with the age dummies suggest that the 
effect of pensions is lower among older men. Two-stage conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation, using the 1862 law as an instrument, yielded coefficients 
almost identical to those obtained from the probit estimates. The estimated 
elasticity for 1910, evaluated at the pension mean of  16.94, is 0.47 (= 0.0112 
[  16.94/0.3989]), somewhat lower than the elasticity estimated for 1900. 
Although an interaction between pension amount and age in the regression 48  Chapter3 
Table 3.5  Probit of Determinants of Probability of Retirement, with Retirement 
Status as the Dependent Variable, 1910 (923 observations,  pseudo 
R* = 0.16) 
~  ~~ 
Variable  Mean  Est.  S.E.  amx 
Dummy = 1 if retired 
Intercept 
Monthly pension 
Dummy = 1 if does not own home 
Age 
Discharged disability 
Health good or fair 
Health poor 
Health status unknown 
Fanner 
Professional or proprietor 
Artisan 
Laborer 
Servant in house 
Boarder in house 
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-  ,0458 
,0703 
-  ,0552 
-  ,0360 
-.I249 
,0527 
-  .2796 
-.0530 
-  ,0976 
,0385 
,1114 
,044  I 
,0680 
-.0141 
Nore: The omitted dummies are good or fair health and farmer. The symbols *, 'i,  and $ indicate 
that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 percent, and I 
percent levels, respectively. aP/ax = p(l/n) C + (x'p), where 4, is the standard normal density, 
and aPlax is in probability units. 
equations was insignificant, there is some suggestion that the effect of pen- 
sions on retirement varied by age. When the 1910 sample is divided into those 
aged seventy or less and those older than seventy, the respective elasticities, 
evaluated  at  the  pension  means,  are  0.62  (= 0.0123  [15.3/0.3033]) and 
0.28 (=  0.0083 [20.2/0.5930]). The elasticity is lower in the older sample both 
because the increase in the probability of  retirement for a dollar increase in 
monthly pension amount is smaller than in a younger sample and because the 
probability of  retirement is much higher. At  older ages, men's  participation 
decision is less sensitive to changes in income. 
Figure 3.5 simulates the effect on  retirement rates of  eliminating Union 
army pensions, showing that retirement rates in the Union sample and in the 
general population, which contains veterans collecting Union army pensions, 
would have  fallen-which  they did in fact do."  The resulting narrowing of 
differentials in retirement rates between the general population and the Union 
army sample suggests that much of the difference in retirement rates between 
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Fig. 3.5  Estimated Effect of Pension Elimination on Retirement Rates in 1900 
and 1910 
Nore: Retirement rates assuming a pension elimination were calculated using the coefficients in 
tables 3.3  and 3.5.  The random samples were drawn from Ruggles and Sobek (1995) and were 
limited to men who either were born in a Union state or, if foreign born, immigrated prior to the 
Civil War.  The random samples contain both veterans and nonveterans and were reweighted to 
have the same age distribution as the veteran sample. Estimates of the fraction collecting Union 
army pensions were used to calculate retirement rates under a pension elimination. For details, 
see Costa (1995b). 
3.4  Confederate and Union Veterans 
Variation in pension amount by whether a recruit was able to trace his dis- 
ability to the war has enabled me to separate the effect of pensions from that 
of health. Another source of variation in the Union army pension program was 
disparate treatment by  type of veteran. Confederates were ineligible. In 1910 
Union pensioners were collecting an average pension of $17 1.90 per year, and 
about 90 percent of  all Union veterans were collecting a pension. Although 
some Confederate states provided pensions, the average pension amount was 
just  $47.24 per year,  and fewer than 30 percent of  all Confederate veterans 
were collecting a pension.I2  Because the Union army pension was extremely 
generous while Confederate pensions were honorariums, then, if  pensions 
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Fig. 3.6  Retirement rates by veteran status among northern-born and 
southern-born men aged sixty-two to seventy-nine in 1910 
Note:  Estimated from Ruggles and Sobek (1995). The trend in retirement rates was smoothed 
using Cleveland’s lowess running line smoother with a band width of 0.4. 
ans should be large and that between Confederate veterans and nonveterans 
small. This pattern is indeed observed in figure 3.6, where to control for differ- 
ences in regional characteristics the sample was divided into those born in a 
Union state, that is, those at risk to serve in the Union army, and those born in 
a Confederate state, that is, those at risk to  serve in the Confederate army. 
Because disability rates were probably higher among Confederate veterans 
than among Union veterans, relative differences in retirement rates between 
veterans and nonveterans in  the two samples cannot be explained by  health 
status.  I3 
An alternative way to compare retirement rates among veterans and nonvet- 
erans within northern- and southern-born samples is to estimate two probits in 
which retirement status is the dependent variable. The advantage is that indi- 
vidual characteristics such as marital status, illiteracy, property ownership, re- 
gion of  residence, extent of urbanization, and whether servants or boarders are 
in the household can be controlled for. Table 3.6, which gives the probits, bears Table 3.6  Probit Predicting Probability Retirement for Northern-Born  and Southern-Born  Aged  62-79  in 1910, with Retirement Status BS the 
Dependent Variable (from Public-Use Census Sample) 
Northern Born  Southern Born 
(4,517 Observations,  (1,224 Observations, 
Pseudo R2  = .lo)  Pseudo R2  = .17) 
Parameter  Parameter 
Variable  Mean  Est.  S.E.  awax  Mean  Est.  S.E.  awax 
Dummy = 1 if retired  .31  .24 
Intercept  -5.37$  .30  -7.07 
Dummy = 1 if: 
Union veteran  .23  .36$  .05  .1160 
Confederate veteran  .38  .03  .09  ,007  1 
Married  .7 1  -.lo*  .05  -.0305  .I1  -.29$  .ll  -.0767 
Illiterate  .04  -.I1  .10  -  .0345  .12  -.15  .13  -.0380 
Has servant  .07  -.15*  .08  -.0484  .04  -  .22  .22  -.0577 
Takes in boarder  .13  -.11*  .06  -.0361  .ll  -  .22  .14  -  ,0568 
Owns no property  .40  .14$  .05  ,0461  .39  .28$  .10  ,0723 
Lives in South  .03  -.lo  .12  -  .0308  .78  -  .03  .ll  -  ,0085 
Lives in urban county  .31  -  .Ol  .05  -.0218  .07  -  .05  .16  -.0127 
Number of dependents  1.24  -.14$  .02  -  .0454  1.63  -  .20$  .04  -  ,0527 
Age  68.22  .07$  .00  .0233  67.84  .W$  .01  .0227 
Source:  The sample consists of white, noninstitutionalized,  native-born men aged 62-79  drawn from the integrated 1910 Census (Ruggles and Sobek 1995). 
Nore: The symbols *, t,  and $ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at at least the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
aP/ax = p(l/n) 1  C+  (x'p). where 4 is the standard normal density, and aPlax is in probability units. 52  Chapter3 
out the results of figure 3.6. In the southern-born sample Confederate veteran 
status is not a significant predictor of retirement. In the northern-born sample, 
Union army veteran  status is, suggesting that Union pensions  led to higher 
retirement rates among veterans. There were a few Confederate veterans in the 
northern-born sample and a few Union veterans in the southern-born sample 
(classified  as  nonveterans  in  table  3.6).14 Although  no  strong  conclusions 
can be drawn from such a small fraction of men in either category, when dum- 
mies  are  included  for these  men, the  coefficient  on Confederate  status  in 
the northern-born  sample  is  insignificant and that on Union veteran  in the 
southern-born sample is significant, suggesting once again that the receipt of 
a pension was an important determinant of retirement status. 
The results presented in table 3.6 can also be used to estimate whether the 
difference in participation rates between the northern- and the Southern-born 
sample is largely due to differences in observable characteristics or in partici- 
pation  behavior. When retirement  rates  from the  northern-born  sample  are 
compared with those from the southern-born  sample, then the difference in 
retirement rates should consist of two components. The first will be the compo- 
nent due to observable differences, such as region of residence or fraction of 
veterans in the population. The second component should be due to differences 
in participation behavior. Union army pensions will lead to differences in the 
participation functions. So might other variables. For example, the northern 
born who lived in the South may have differed in unobservable retirement de- 
terminants. More formally, let R" be the probability of retirement among the 
northern born, R' the probability among the southern born, and X" and J?  the 
vectors of northern- and southern-born characteristics, respectively. Then 
R" -  R"  = [R"(X") - R"(X"]  + [R"(XS) - R"(X"], 
where the first term is predicted using the northern-born participation equation 
for both samples, and the second term is the residual component due to differ- 
ences in participation behavior between northern and southern born using the 
southern-born sample. The actual difference in retirement rates is 0.0722. Us- 
ing the northern-born participation equation for both samples yields a value of 
0.0445 for the second term, suggesting that differences in participation behav- 
ior and thus pensions account for about 62 percent of the difference in retire- 
ment rates between the southern and the northern born. When men aged eighty 
to ninety-one  are included  in the  sample, regressions  on the northern-  and 
southern-born  samples suggest that differences  in participation  behavior  ac- 
count for about 39 percent of the difference in retirement rates between the 
southern and the northern born. Although the coefficient on an interaction term 
between age and Union army veteran was statistically significant only at the 
20 percent level, it was negative, suggesting that being a Union army veteran 
had a smaller effect on the participation decision of older relative to younger 
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3.5  Implications 
I have demonstrated that Union army pensions exerted a large effect on male 
labor force participation rates. The elasticity of labor force nonparticipation 
with respect to pension income was 0.73 in  1900 and 0.47 in 1910. I argued 
that these estimates were unbiased. They can therefore be used to calculate the 
effect of  a secular increase in income on the secular decline in male labor 
force participation rates, under the assumption that the elasticity of labor force 
nonparticipation with respect to pension income remained constant after 1900. 
The retirement rate for men sixty-five years of age or older rose from 35 per- 
cent in 1900 to 83 percent in 1990, and per capita fixed reproducible tangible 
wealth rose by 415 per~ent.'~  Therefore, using the 1910 pension elasticity of 
nonparticipation, an increase in income, holding wages constant, could explain 
60 percent of the decline in labor force participation rates. 
Mounting evidence, however, suggests that the elasticity of labor force non- 
participation with respect to income was lower in the period after 1940  than in 
my estimates.  According to my results, the elasticity of labor force nonpartici- 
pation was 0.73 in 1900, when the median age of veterans was fifty-six, and 
0.47 in 1910, when the median age was sixty-six. But others find far lower 
estimates for the period after 1940. 
Friedberg's (1996) estimates of  the effect of  Social Security Old Age and 
Assistance in 1940 and in 1950, given to those age sixty-five and older, imply 
an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to benefits of around 
0.25-0.42.  The majority of  studies using data from the late 1960s on find a 
similar or smaller effect on labor force participation rates of either assets or 
Social Security retirement and disability payments (Bound 1989; Bound and 
Waidmann 1992; Hausman and Wise 1985; Haveman and Wolfe 1984a, 1984b; 
Krueger and Pischke 1992). Among men in their early sixties Hausman and 
Wise (1985) estimate an elasticity of 0.23 and Krueger and Pischke (1992) one 
of 0. Elasticities of labor force nonparticipation with respect to assets in these 
studies are close to 0. Bound (1989) finds an elasticity of labor force nonpartic- 
ipation with respect to Social Security disability of  0.16 among men aged 
forty-five to sixty-four. Studies finding a more sizable effect of Social Security 
payments on labor force nonparticipation are those of Hurd and Boskin (1984), 
Leonard (1979), and Parsons (1980). For example, Parsons (1980) calculates 
an elasticity with respect to Social Security disability of 0.63. The results of 
selected studies are summarized in table 3.7. 
Statistical problems may bias some of the estimates presented in table 3.7 
upward. Leonard (1979) and Parsons (1980) compare the labor force participa- 
tion rates of those whose potential disability benefits would replace a relatively 
large fraction of their predisability earnings to those whose potential benefits 
would not. Since replacement rates for disability benefits are decreasing func- 
tions of past earnings, it is difficult to determine  whether generous replacement 54  Chapter3 
Table 3.7  Elasticities of Labor Force Nonparticipation  in Selected Studies 
Study  Age of Sample  Year Studied  With Respect to  Elasticity 
Costa (this chapter) 
Parsons (1980) 
Leonard (1979) 
Haveman and Wolfe 
(1984a.  1984b) 
Bound (1989) 
Costa (this chapter) 
Friedberg (1996) 
Hurd and Boskin 
Hausman and Wise 
(1984) 
(1985) 
Krueger and Pischke 
(  1992) 
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Source: The elasticities given for Friedberg (1996), Hurd and Boskin (1984), and Hausman and Wise 
(1985) were estimated using the information provided by  the authors. 
rates or low earnings induce the individual to leave the labor force. Haveman 
and Wolfe (1984a, 1984b) try to avoid the problem of the endogeneity of the 
replacement rate through the use of  an instrumental variables procedure in 
which they first predict disability benefits as a function of exogenous informa- 
tion and then incorporate these predicted values into the final estimation equa- 
tion. They estimate an elasticity of 0.06-0.21.  Bound (1989) avoids the endo- 
geneity problem by  using those who applied for disability benefits but were 
rejected as a control group for beneficiaries. He also estimates a low elastic- 
ity (0.16). 
Some of the estimates of the effect of Social Security retirement benefits on 
retirement may also be biased upward. A potential problem with most studies 
is that the source of variation across individuals, differing levels of Social Se- 
curity benefits, arises because of past earnings history. Past earnings are likely 
to be correlated with present labor supply and thus bias upward estimates of 
the effect of  Social Security.'6 A few studies use other sources of  variation. 
Friedberg (1996) uses state variation in benefits to identify the influence of 
Old Age Assistance on labor supply. Krueger and Pischke (1992) examine an 
unexpected legislative change that substantially reduced benefits to individuals 
born after 1916, leading to a worker who retired at age sixty-five after a career 
of  earning the average wage to receive Social Security benefits that were 13 
percent lower than he would have received had he been born in 1916. They 55  Income and Retirement 
concluded that Social Security wealth had a negative, but insignificant, effect 
on the probability of retirement. The income elasticity of retirement therefore 
appears to have fallen from 0.47 in 1910, to 0.25-0.42 in 1940 and 1950, to 0 
in recent years. 
What therefore needs to be explained is why elasticities estimated from the 
Union army sample are so much higher than elasticities  with respect to transfer 
income estimated from recent data. One possibility is that there has been a 
change in  the income elasticity of retirement. Another is that elasticities of 
nonparticipation with respect to assets or Social Security benefits may not be 
comparable to those calculated with respect to Union army pensions. Assets 
are not necessarily exogenous, and Social Security payments will have both an 
income and  a substitution effect. With the exception of  the unique circum- 
stances examined by  Krueger and Pischke (1992), it is plausible to assume 
that the future stream of Social Security payments was predicted with greater 
accuracy by  men in their working years than was the future stream of Union 
army payments. Another difference  exists because Union army pensions repre- 
sented a larger fraction of earnings than do Social Security disability payments 
today, the former constituting 36 percent of  the annual earnings of nonfarm 
laborers in 1900, the latter 36 percent. Furthermore, Union army pensions were 
the only available retirement program, whereas Social Security disability pay- 
ments represent 75 percent of all transfer payments (estimated from Center for 
Human Resource Research 1985). 
If  noncomparability of  elasticities calculated with respect to Union army 
pension income and those calculated with respect to Social Security payments 
arises from Union army pensions being at the time the only available transfer 
program, then the retirement elasticity with respect to Union army pensions 
can be adjusted to account for this. Thus, if total transfer income were $12.90 
per month in  1900, which is what the average Union army pension paid, a 
program equivalent in scale and scope to Social Security Disability would have 
paid $9.70 per month in 1900 (or 0.75 [$12.90]). Retirement income includes 
not only transfer income but also private pensions. Disability payments repre- 
sent 67 percent of  the sum of transfer income and private pensions today, 
translating into $8.60 of $12.90 per month in 1900. Using the 1900 regression 
produces an elasticity of  0.56 (= 0.0078 [9.7/0.1343]) for the equivalent of 
Social Security disability and one of 0.51 (= 0.0075 [8.6/0.1259]) for that of 
transfer income plus private pensions.” Similar calculations using the 19 10 
regression estimates yield an elasticity of 0.40 (= 0.01  12 [  12.4/0.3473]),  also 
substantial.I8  Furthermore, the average Union army pension in 1900 and 1910 
was about as generous as the average Social Security retirement benefit, 
The elasticities given in table 3.7 therefore suggest that the responsiveness 
of retirement to income has fallen since 1900. Workers may now be less re- 
sponsive to changes in transfer income because they  are no longer close to 
subsistence levels; instead, they reach retirement age with enough to satisfy 
their consumption needs. Each additional dollar of income will therefore have 56  Chapter3 
less of an effect on their decision. Alternatively, workers’ choices may now be 
constrained by  a retirement ethos. Once a sizable fraction of  older men  are 
retired, unresponsiveness to pension payments may be the outcome of a “band- 
wagon” effect or of a desire to conform to societal expectations. By establish- 
ing age sixty-five and later age sixty-two as an “official” retirement age, Social 
Security may  have led individuals to want to retire at that age and therefore 
reduced the effect of income on the work decision. The men remaining in the 
labor force may be those who are greatly attached to work and who can be 
induced to leave the labor force only by a very large sum of money. 
Workers may also be less responsive to changes in transfer income because 
leisure has become relatively more attractive and less expensive. In chapter 7 
I discuss how in the 1920s and 1930s new technologies such as the car, the 
phonograph, the radio, and movies increased the variety of recreational activi- 
ties and lowered their price. These new goods diffused rapidly throughout the 
population. At the same time public recreational facilities, such as parks, golf 
courses, and swimming pools, put recreational sports within the reach of more 
and more individuals. In 1934 the pension advocate Isaac Rubinow noted that 
wintering in Florida and summering on Michigan lakes was how many of the 
well-to-do spent their lives after age sixty-five (Rubinow 1934, 243). Even 
during the 1930s large numbers of the elderly migrated to the Pacific Coast 
and South Atlantic regions. Their numbers increased after the Second World 
War.  By  1940 private insurance companies offering retirement income plans 
advertised those plans as offering “freedom from money worries. You can have 
all the joys of  recreation or travel when the time comes at which every man 
wants them most.”19  Graebner (1980, 215-41) argues that there was a national 
effort to glorify retirement in the 1950s and describes how retirement was ag- 
gressively  marketed  as  a  consumable  commodity  by  corporations,  labor 
unions, and insurance companies that were pension plan trustees. Companies 
established retirement preparation programs, and journals aimed at retired em- 
ployees were increasingly filled with idyllic depictions of the retired life. What 
is not known is the extent to which increased retirement induced the marketing 
and the extent to which the marketing induced retirement. 
The marketing of retirement in the 1950s,  however, was accompanied by the 
continued growth of leisure industries. Now mass tourism and mass entertain- 
ment, such as films, television, golf, and spectator sports, provide activities for 
the elderly at a low price. As the desirability of leisure increased, the elasticity 
of labor force nonparticipation with respect to pension income may have de- 
creased. I take this point up again in chapter 7. Once retirement was seen as a 
period of personal fulfillment rather than a period before death when men were 
too ill to work, more men may have found retirement desirable, even if their 
retirement activities were limited. 
A fall in the income elasticity of retirement implies that, while secular in- 
creases in income explain a larger share of  the rise in retirement rates at the 
beginning of the century, they explain much less at the century’s end. The 1910 57  Income and Retirement 
estimate of the elasticity of  nonparticipation implies that 90 percent of  the 
decline in labor force participation rates between 1900 and 1930 could be at- 
tributed to secularly rising incomes. Friedberg’s (1996) estimates suggest that 
at least half the decline between 1930 and 1950 can be accounted for by secu- 
larly rising incomes. In  contrast, rising  incomes may  explain none of  the 
1950-80  decline.20  The findings also suggest that, as leisure continues to grow 
more attractive, changes in transfer policies alone may not be enough to induce 
large increases in labor force participation rates among the elderly. 
3.6  Summary 
This chapter investigated the effect of  Union army pensions on veterans’ 
retirement rates, finding that the elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to 
Union army pension income was 0.73 in 1900 and 0.47 in 1910, when veterans 
were older and their participation decision was less sensitive to changes in 
income. The findings suggest that secularly rising income explains a substan- 
tial part of increased retirement rates, particularly before 1940. Rising incomes 
cannot, however, account for most of  the recent increase in retirement rates. 
Comparisons with elasticities of nonparticipation with respect to Social Secu- 
rity income imply that the income elasticity of retirement has decreased with 
time, either because of changing societal expectations or because of  increas- 
ingly attractive leisure-time opportunities. Not only can most men now afford 
to retire, but, when they do retire, they can look forward to a variety of low- 
cost leisure activities. 
Notes 
1. Imputations for annual incomes are given in Preston and Haines (1991, 212-20, 
table A. 1). The pension represented an even greater proportion of the earnings of older 
men because of the sharp decline in the age-earnings profile. 
2. The pension records, which include the successive reports of the examining sur- 
geons of the Pension Bureau, are currently being linked to the 1850, 1860, 1900, and 
1920 censuses and to army service records to reconstruct the life histories of a random 
sample of men who served in the Union army. The collection of these data is still ongo- 
ing; therefore, nonrandom subsamples of the data are used in the statistical analysis. 
3. However, because property was one of  the primary modes of savings, men who 
had retired might already have liquidated their property. 
4.  The statewide unemployment numbers  are from Keyssar (1986, 340-41,  table 
A.13). 
5.  The coefficients on a spline in age are insignificant, and the use of a spline leaves 
the regression results unchanged. Similarly, the use of a quadratic term in age does not 
affect the results. 
) is a standard 
normal density function, P is the probit coefficient, and n is the number of observations. 
6. The values of aP/an were calculated as P(1ln) C +(x’P),  where +( 58  Chapter3 
7. Using symbols, 
I*  = (YP  + z:,p  + u, , 
9 = rI’Z,  + v, 
where Z:  is not observed, only the dummy variable, Z, = 1 if retired and 0 otherwise, is. 
P,  is pension amount; Zln  is the vector of  exogenous variables (all variables except for 
pension  amount) and is a subset of Z,, which also contains the instrumental variable 
indicating whether a recruit fell under the General Law. The instrumental variable is not 
included in the retirement  equation. The normally distributed error terms are repre- 
sented by  u, and y.  Rivers and Vuong (1988) present formulas for the standard errors. 
When the coefficient on the residuals in the second stage is equal to zero, the standard 
errors are the usual probit standard errors. There was little difference between the cor- 
rected and the uncorrected second-stage standard errors. 
8. A Hausman test for exogeneity of pension amount is used. 
9. Men for whom such information is unavailable do not differ in observable charac- 
10. The bias could go either way. 
11. Among the white male population in 1900, 15 percent of those aged fifty to fifty- 
nine,  18 percent of those sixty to sixty-nine, and 9 percent of those seventy to eighty- 
one were collecting a Union army pension. Among the white male population either 
born in a Union state or, if  foreign born, who immigrated prior to the Civil War,  28 
percent of those aged fifty to fifty-nine, 33 percent of those sixty to sixty-nine, and 22 
percent  of  those  seventy to  eighty-one  were collecting  a Union Army  pension  (for 
sources, see Costa 1995b). Retirement rates among nonveterans in  1900 are calculated 
from 
teristics from men for whom this information is available. 
RE = R”(fraction  veterans)  + Rn,(fraction  nonveterans) , 
where R,  is the retirement rate of the general population, Rv that of veterans, and R,, 
that of nonveterans. Assuming that a pension elimination affects only veteran retirement 
rates, new retirement rates for the veteran general population can be estimated. 
12. Glasson (1918a, 1918b) gives the number of Civil War veterans on the pension 
rolls in  1910. Because of  undernumeration  of veterans in the  1910 census, the total 
number  of  Union army veterans is estimated  from a life table and is from Series Y 
957-970  in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975, 1145). Assuming that undernumeration 
of veterans did not vary among Union and Confederate veterans, the number of Confed- 
erate veterans can be calculated from the 1910 public-use sample. 
13. Although disability levels for Confederate veterans are unavailable, young men in 
the South were almost three times as likely to die during the Civil War as were young 
northern men (Vinovskis 1990). 
14. If  these men are classified as either Confederate veterans in the northern-born 
sample or as Union army veterans in the southern-born sample, then the coefficients in 
table 3.6 do not change. 
15. The increase in per capita fixed reproducible tangible wealth was calculated from 
US. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1986,322-70).  Retirement incomes have kept pace 
with per capita wealth between 1950 and 1990, increasing by 90 percent, but between 
1900 and 1990 rose by more than per capita wealth. 
16. An additional problem arises with Hurd and Boskin’s (1984) study. Their high 
elasticity may be an artifact of the way they selected the population at risk to retire (see 
Diamond and Hausman 1984). 59  income and Retirement 
17. Of course, savings, wages of family members, and income from part-time work 
are now greater than in 1900. Therefore, a monthly transfer is likely to have a smaller 
effect at high than at low levels of retirement. 
18. Hurd and Shoven (1982) estimated that Social Security retirement benefits ac- 
count for 73 percent of  nonwage income, excluding Medicare and Medicaid payments. 
Including Medicare and Medicaid payments, Social Security payments account for 37 
percent of nonwage income, and the elasticity becomes 0.24 (= 0.0103 [6.7/0.286]). 
19. Insurance company advertisement from a 1940 issue of Newsweek, reproduced in 
Haber and Gratton (1994, 64). 
20. Secular increases in income were proxied by increases in per capita fixed repro- 
ducible wealth. 